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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALBERT P. NEILSON and EILEEN 
W. NEILSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ISADORE EISEN, 
Defend.amt and Appellarnt. 
STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
Case No. 
7306 
In presenting this case upon appeal, Ap.pellant has 
completely abandoned every contention both of law and 
fact that he presented to the trial court and consequently 
hi'S statement of facts· does not fairly or accurately pre-
sent to this court a complete factual picture. We there-
fore desire to supplement and correct the statement as 
foUowR: 
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Albert P. Neilson, Respondent herein, is a local con-
tractor of long standing, engaged primarily in the con-
struction of residences ( Tr. 94). During the year 1946, 
upon real estate owned by him, he constructed and sold 
nineteen ( 19) re'Sidences in the vicinity of Harrison Ave-
nue and 18th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 94-95). 
Some of these residences he sold through his own efforts 
and some throught the efforts of realtors (Tr. 51). Upon 
the latter sales he paid the full and regular commission 
(Tr. 71) and used the selling faeili ties of several real 
estate companies, including those of the Scott Invest-
ment C·ompany (Tr. 5~). It was this company that con-
ducted the negotiations with the App~ellant about the 
purchase of the residenee involved in this cas1e. 
Appellant became interested in buying the property 
during the ·early construction period and in June, 1946, 
was negotiating with the Scott Investment Company 
(Tr. 61-62). On June 7, 1946, Appellant made his first 
offer for the prope.rty, evidenced by Exhibits 1 and A. 
This proposal by Appellant was for $21,000.00, $1,000.00 
being deposited on June 7, with the 'S·cott Investment 
Company and the whole p~roposal being contingent on 
two factors: (a) Sale of certain property owned by 
Eisen and (h) Acceptance of the contract by Respondent. 
It is undisputed that neither contingency occurred-
the Eisen property was not sold and the proposal was 
not accepted by Respondent. Consequently, Scott Invest-
ment Company returned Eisen''S deposit on July lOth. 
(Exhibit B, Tr. 64). The significance of this preliminary 
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transaction, "\Ve believe to be t\vo-fold: (a) Eisen's offeT 
(Exhibit A) conten1plated a brick garage and (b) the 
\\"ritten n1atters ""ere handled for Eisen h)T a member of 
his fa1nily, Eisen being blind. 
Appellant and the real ·estate company continued to. 
negotiate and in August a similar but new p~roposal was 
forth-coming. The price was raised from $21,000.00 to 
$22,000.00. Eisen deposited $2,000.00 instead of $1,000.00 
\Vith the real estate firm (Exhibits 3 and C). Ho,vever, 
the same two contingencies continued-a purchas·e for 
Eisen's West 8th South Street property had to be found 
and the proposal had to be accepted by Respondent. 
Again neither contingency occurred. Although Appel-
lant, in the trial court, pleaded (Paragraph 3, Defend-
ant's answer, Tr. 15) and contended that-it was under the 
August lOth agreement that Eisen purchased the home, 
his position was wholly untenable and we believe the 
significance of the agreement to again be two-fold: 
(a) A conflict in the testimony arose as to whether 
the August proposal contemplated a brick or a frame 
garage. Appellant claimed a brick garage. The witness, 
Scott, testified a~ follows: 
'' Q. Now, you are referring to the Eighth 
South-
A. Eighth South property, yes, and I think that 
is embodied in that agreement. At that time 
it was agreed that Mr. Eisen would not be 
bound by the earnest money if he had to take 
less than $8,500.00 for his property, and we 
wouldn't he hound to hold the propert~· n1ore 
than ~ixt~· rlay~. 
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Albert I->. Neilson, Respondent herein, is a local con-
tractor of long standing, engaged primarily in the con-
struction of residences ( Tr. 94). During the year 1946, 
upon real estate owned by him, he constructed and sold 
nineteen (19) residences in the vicinity of Harrison Ave-
nue and 18th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 94-95). 
Some of the·se residences he sold through his own efforts 
and some throught the efforts of realtors (Tr. 51). Upon 
the latter sales he paid the full and regular commission 
( Tr. 71) and used the selling facilities of several real 
estate companies, including those of the Scott Invest-
ment C·ompany (Tr. 5~). It was this company that con-
ducted the negotiations with the Appellant about the 
purchase of the residence involved in this cas1e. 
Appellant became interested in buying the propert~· 
during the early construction period and in June, 1946, 
was negotiating with the Scott Investment Company 
(Tr. 61-62). On June 7, 1946, Appellant made his first 
offer for the prope.rty, evidenced by Exhibits 1 and A. 
This proposal by Appellant was for $21,000.00, $1,000.00 
being deposited on June 7, with the 'Scott Investment 
Company and the whole p~roposal being contingent on 
two factors: (a) Sale of certain property owned by 
Eisen and (b) Acceptance of the contract by Respondent. 
It is undisputed that neither contingency occurred-
the Eisen property was not sold and the proposal was 
not accepted hy Respondent. Consequently, Scott Invest-
lnent Company returned Eisen'·s deposit on July lOth. 
(Exhibit B, Tr. 64). The significance of this preliminary 
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trans·action, we believe to be two-fold: (a) Eisen's offer 
(Exhibit A) contemplated a brick garage and (b) the 
\\?ritten n1atters '""ere handled for Eisen by a member of 
his fa1nily, Eisen being9 blind. 
Appellant and the real ·estate company continued to 
negotiate and in August a similar but new proposal was 
forth-coming. The price was raised from $21,000.00 to 
$22,000.00. Eisen deposited $2.,000.00 instead of $1,000.00 
with the real estate firrn (Exhibits 3 and C). Hovvever, 
the same two contingencies continued-a purchase for 
Eisen's West 8th South Street property had to he found 
and the proposal had to be accepted by Respondent. 
Again neither contingency occurred. Although Appel-
lant, in the trial court, pleaded (Paragraph 3, Defend-
ant's answer, Tr. 15) and contended that it was under the 
August lOth agreement that Eisen purchased the home, 
his position vvas wholly untenable and we believe the 
significance of the agreement to again be two-fold: 
(a) A conflict in the testimony arose as to whether 
the August proposal contemplated a brick or a frame 
garage. Appellant claimed a brick garage. The witness, 
Scott, testified a~ follows : 
'' Q. Now, you are referring to the Eighth 
South-
A. Eighth S·outh property, yes, and I think that 
is embodied iil that agreement. At that tin1e 
it was agreed that Mr. Eisen would not be 
bound by the earnest money if he had to take 
less than $8,500.00 for his property, and vve 
wouldn't he hound to hold the propert~· rnore 
than sixty day~. 
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Q. Now, you wiU recall that attached to the 
June ·earnest money receipt there was an 
addenda calling for some specifications on 
the Harrison Avenue prop~erty. Was there 
any conversation relative to that~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the August meeting~ 
A. Yes. It "\Vas definitely understood that all 
the specifications would he identical with the 
exception of the garage, which had already 
been started. During that interim of time 
when the other agreement was cancelled out 
and before the other one was consumated, 
progre-ss had been continued on the Harrison 
Avenue property, and the garage had al-
ready been started, and that was to be the 
only exception on the completion of specifi-
cations. 
Q. Now, at the time of execution of this agree-
ment dated August 10, was there attached 
to it any specifications a.t all~ 
A. Not at the time it was signed up, because I 
didn't have any specifications with me. 
Q. I show you what I have had marked Exhibit 
C and ask you to identify that. 
A. Yes. This was-this set of specifications was 
part of three or four copies-! don't know 
which they are-made up when I got back 
to the office, a ·copy of which we kept, a copy 
of which was forwarded to Mr. Eisen. 
Q. Approximately on what date~ 
A. Well, I believe it was the same day that I 
brought the earnest money back to the office. 
I just had the other specs. copied with th(? 
exception of the garage and mailed it out. 
Q. And the substance as contained in Exhihit 
C "ras the-
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--:\. T·hat 'Yns thP hnsh~ of our (lisenssion. The 
garage had alrpndy bPPn sta rtt>d. J)uring 
that period of tilne in t hPrP the garagp, had 
already been started, and it had to continue 
on. l)rogre~~ on the houst\ had been delayed 
under the tern1~ of the otla~r agreement any-
how·.q (Tr. 68-69). 
The Respondent, Neilson, testified: 
'' Q. N o,v, after the concrete slab is laid, is it 
praetical to put a brick garage up~ 
A. It would be very impractical. The city in-
spector vvouldn 't allow it. 
Q. Did you have any dealings with the defendant 
Isadore Eisen or any of his children prior 
to Decen1ber 7, 1946, which is the date of the 
contract in evidence which bears. your sig-
nature J? 
A. Not to my knowledge, only just conversation 
when he come out on the project." (Tr. 97). 
(b) The written matters were again handled for 
Appellant by a member of his family, whose authority 
was unquestioned. (Exhibit C). 
Although the first two proposals submitted by Eisen 
had not been acceptable to Respondent, Eisen remained 
interested in the home. Eisen, members of his family, 
and ~rr. Bernstein, attorney for Eisen, contacted the 
witness, Scott, from time to time ( Tr. 72). Construction 
of the home continued and a fram·e garage was built. 
This Appellant knew. (Tr. 169). Early in December, 
1946, the witness, S;eott, received a telephone call from 
Mr. Bernstein to the effe·ct that "they were ready to 
elos·e that Eisen deal." ( Tr .. 73). 
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On December 7th, a meeting was held in Mr. Bern-
stein's office at whieh the agreements evidenced by ex-
hibits 4 and 5 were pr~pared by Mr. Bernstein and ex-
ecuted for the Buyer by his daughter, Freda. A check 
endorsed by the daughter upon Appiellant's account and 
in his name for the sum of $5, 094.85 was delivered to the 
witness Scott (Exhibit 7). Eisen was not present at the 
meeting but authorized his daughter to meet and act in 
his behalf (Tr. 122). He denies that he knew she had 
sign·ed a contract for him but in view of the fact that 
his attorney and two members of the family were present, 
that he took possesion pursuant to the agreement, made 
payments according to the terms of the contract (Ex-
hibit A) and admits that he and he. alone was the pur-
chaser of the property (''I was the only one who bought 
that home, and I was the only one paid for it.") (Tr. 
140), overwhelms a convenient denial on this point. 
The Respondent accepted the De-cember 7th agree-
ment, the hom·e was completed, and Eisen took possession 
and is still in possession. Eisen paid $6,500.00 to N·eilson 
on January 10, 1947, pursuant to the contract (Exhibit 
8) but refused to make the final payment of $8,500.00. 
This litigation ensued from his refusal. 
Appellant concedes that he 1owes Respondent $8,500.00 
pursuant ·to a contract of purchas-e but claimed the right 
to deduct the sum of $2,392.08, largely fron1 alleged 
damage due to Respondent's failure to erect a brick 
garage. (Paragraph 5, Defendant's Answe-r, Tr. 16). He 
has com·pletely abandoned this claim on appeal. 
G 
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\\~ e have set forth to son1e length thP factual de-
velopment8 of this controversy in the belief that the 
record indicates so ru1npletely the 1nerit of the trial 
court's decision that .. A .. ppellant O\Ycs the balance- of the 
contract purchase price and should pay it and that this 
appeal is merely an atte1npt to grasp at technical straws 
and is \Yholly \\ithout 1uerit. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMEN·T 
_A_s the record discloses and Appellant admits, there 
is no question as to the liability of the App·e1lant to Re-
spondent. In the court below, the issue was simply: How 
n1uch? N o,v, on appeal and for the first time, Appellant 
raises three technical questions, not one of which goes 
to the substance of the controversy. We shall therefore, 
first address ourselves to the question of whether Appel-
lant can avail himself of a new theory on appeal and 
then shall consider his technical objections in the orde-r 
presented in Appellant's brief. 
POIN'f 1 
NON-PERFORMANCE ·OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
CANNO'T BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
Appellant's principal argument. on appeal appears 
to be that the tender of a deed was a condition preeedent 
to the bringing of this action. As we will later point out, 
we do not believe this contention to have merit as applied 
to the instant factual situation. However, regardless of 
the 1nnrit of the contention, it cannot be first raised on 
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appeal. The rule is well settled rthat, regardless of the 
merit of the contention, non-pe-rformance of a condition 
precedent cannot be raised for the first time on app~eai. 
A multitude of authority annotated under Appeal and 
Error, Key No. 173 ( 4) sup;ports the rule in all juris-
dictions. 
In the early California case of Cast·ro vs. Gill, 5 Cal. 
40, it was held that in an action for the possession of 
land held under a lea:se, an o hj·ection that a notice to quit 
had not been served could not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
Current decisions are to the same effect. The court 
of Errors. and Appeals in New Jersey would not consider 
for the first time on appe-al the failur;e of an insurance 
company to first tender or return an unearned portion 
of a premium. 
''The only other contention made by the Ap-
:pellant is that the defendant was not entitled to a 
judgment because it failed to return, or tender a 
return of the premium on the policy in question. 
As to this it is sufficient to say that the point is 
not now available to the Appellant to bring about 
a reversal even if the point we-re meritorious. We 
express no opinion whatever on whether it has 
merit. The question was not raised in the court 
below. Only an objection which was laid before 
the trial cour,t will be considered by an appellate 
court in review· of the trial court's judgment. 
This was not raised.'' Prooacci vs. United Stat-es 
Fire Insurance Comp,any, 193 A 180 (New Jer-
s·ey). 
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The contention that a condition· precedent had not 
been perforined-in that contractual remedies had not been 
exhausted before suit for damages 'vas brought, was not 
allo,ved in Edelstein rs. JJuluJh "AI & I llnil~road ronl-
pa n y, 31 N''r 2d -!G~. The court said: 
"The ~uggestion made for the first time on 
the appeal that plaintjffs cannot maintain these 
actions for failure to exaust contractual remedies 
will not b~ considered, under· the well-settled rule 
that points not raised in the lo,ver court and 
raised for the first time on appeal will not h~ 
considered.'' 
Nor can w·aiverbe first raised on ap~peal. 
"The final proposition urged by defendants 
will not be considered by this court for .the reason 
that the claimed defense was not properly urged 
~bet ore the trial court.'' Wood vs. Jon,than Bixby 
Conzpany,_ (California) 84 Pac. 2d 204._· 
California'.is quite emphatic in upholding the prop~o­
sition that non-p·erforrriance of a '(~,onditinn :precedent 
cannot for the first. time be ·raised .on ap·p~aL ··.-In Los 
Angeles Investment Comp_an~ vs. Home Savitngs ~;f!nk of 
Los .Angelps,. 182 P~c. 293, the.tende,r pf som·e chec~~s wa~. 
a condition precedent to the suit involving such checks. 
The pleadings and record were silent on such tender ~nd 
the matter was first raised on appeal. In c.onsidering this 
matter, the court stated: 
"It is clear that the point was not made at 
the trial, that the cause was tried on other issues 
entirely and as if this point were not present, 
and that the necessity of proving either tender 
or an excuse for it was not brought to ~~he plain-
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tiffs atte,ntio.n. Such a point, which the plaintiff 
might,. a:qd ~n this. case in all probability could, 
have niet hy sufficient evidence if obj.ection to 
its recovery had been made on this ground at the 
trial, cannot be rais·ed for the first time on ap-
peal.'' 
POINT 2 
UNDER THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF THE INSTANT 
CASE A TENDER OF A DEED WAS NIOT A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION. 
Even in those jurisdictions holding that a final pur-
chase money suit should be predicated upon a tender of 
deed the rule is not applied whe~e th·e purchaser denies 
the contract or otherwise indicates that a tender would 
be futile. 
:, 'A~'· ·a 'gerieral rule, if the purchaser has 
renderetl a tender of the deed futile by his repudia-
. tion of: the contract or his express declaration that 
he will not receive it this will ordinarily dispense 
with its tender as a condition precedent to the 
right of the ve.ndor to base a claim of non-p·erfor-
manee by the purehaser. '' (55 American Juris-
prudenee, Paragraph 325 Page 754.) 
· The rule seems clearly ap;plicable to this case. On 
·October 15, 1947 and long arter this controversy arose, 
Mr. Bernstein, attorney for Appellant, and acting for 
him wrot~ in part : 
''I am authorized to advise you by the pur-
·ehaser that the balance of $8,500.00 will not be 
paid until the following items are completed to 
wit: Sink ,taps in small bathroom; chron1e around 
dining-room windows; windows in garage doors; 
coving for kitchen floor; screens for moveable 
windows.'' (Ex. E). 
10 
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In view of these statements on the part of Eisen and 
his prior conduct, it \Yas apparent to Respondent that it 
was futile for hilu to atten1pt to get Eisen to perforn1. 
The letter specificall~T indicates that the tender of a deed 
would be useless, as Eisen was attempting to impose 
condition after condition upon hin1. Neilson had already 
done more 'vork.-upon the home .than_ 'v~s ~ailed for (Tr. 
105), including the installation of a special gate or door 
across the basement. stairs (Tr.168). 
The futility of tendering a deed to Eisen became a 
certainty as the issues were joined by the pleadings and 
at the trial. Eisen specifically denied having purchased 
under the contract upon which Respondent relied. No 
clearer repudiation of the December contract could be 
made, (Defendant's answer, Paragraph 3, Tr. 15) than 
when Appellant claiJ?ed under another and different 
contract. 
Eisen would not have accepted a deed and won't 
now. His contention in that regard, raised for the first 
time on appeal, is totally wirthout merit in law or fact. 
In addition to the fact that the tender of a deed is 
not required when such a tender would be just a useless 
gesture, there is -considerable and respectable authorit~r 
to the effect that a tender is not a condition precedent 
where the purchaser is in possession of the property. 
The authorities to this effect are collected and annotated 
in 35 A. L. R., 123. 
The reason for the rule as announced is obvious: 
The possessory interest of the purchaser adequately p·ro-
tects hitn against any and all wrongful aets of the seller. 
11 
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Utah seems to Teeognize this rule .. In Burg.e · vs. J ef-
ferson, 80 Utah 374,.15 Pacific 2d, 326, the court held that 
under a judgment in ejectment, the vendors execution of 
contract and tender thereof to purchaser was not a condi-
tion precedent to .requiring purchaser's payment of de-
ferred installm·ents or to declaration of forfeiture. 
P~OINT 3 · 
WHERE RELIEF IS GRANTED C10NSISTENT WITH 
THE ISSUES AND THE~ORY UPON WHICH A CASE IS 
TRIED, COMPLAINT CAN_NOT BE MADE F·OR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT O'THER AND DIFFER-
ENT RELIEF N!OT URGED UPON THE TRIAL OOURT 
SH~OULD H·AVE BEEN GIVEN. 
Appellant, for the first time, now urges that Respon.;. 
dent should have been order·ed to convey subjeet to an 
existing encumbrance. As we will subsequently point 
·out (Respondent's Brief, Point 4), .Appellant's argument 
is based entirely upon a mistaken and incorrect state-
ment of ·.fact. However, ·even if his factual statements 
were horne out. hy the record. Appellant· cannot rais·e 
such an issue for the first time on appeal. It is. entirely 
inconsistent with every contention he has previously 
made. 
As. we have attempted to emphasize, the issue below 
was : How much did Eisen owe~ And the conflict \Yasupon 
the question of whether or not Eis·en had agreedto huilrl 
a brick ·garage. Counsel for Appellant admits this. · 
Question (by Mr. Metos) : '~Now, I '11. call your 
_attention to Exhibit A and ask you to run 
through that, specifications of the resideneP 
· located at Harrison Avenue, and ask you if 
12 
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those "TtAre not the one~ ~·on furnished to 
Scott InYestmen t Con1pan~·. '' 
Ans\\Ter (by 1\lr. Neilson) : "These were never 
"Tritten by n1e to n1y kn<)\vledge. I think T 
agreed to everything on this-I'm not abso-
lutely positiYe-bnt the garage.,, 
Q. "You agreed to eYerything that's on there~'' 
.... :\.. ''As far as-if I did see it, the garage seemed 
to be the big i ten1. '' 
Q. '• \\Tell, of course, that's the issue in this law-
suit. You agree to everything except what is 
the issue in this la1vsuit. That's right, isn't 
it~'' (Tr. 105). 
And the prayer of Appellant's answer clearly indi-
cates that his present claim is but an after-thought. 
"WHEREFORE, defendants having fully 
answered, pray that plaintiffs' complaint be dis-
missed; that they be ordered by the Court to de-
liver to defendant Isadore Eisen a Warranty 
Deed of said premises upon the defendant Isadore 
Eisen paying to plaintiffs the sum of $6,107.92, 
and for such other and further relief as may be 
just in the premises." (Tr. 16). 
An appellate court should not now listen to a con-
trary, inconsistent theory. 
''The Supreme Court does not look with fa-
vor upon a contention ·of a party made in the 
Supreme Court for the first tin1e, particular}~· 
where the rontention is inconsistent with the posi-
tion of that litigant in the eourt below.'' M eM ullin 
vs. Magnuson, ( C~o}orado) 78 Pacifie 2d, 964. 
An examination of the re-cord reveals that the ex-
i~tenre of a construction 1nortgage on the property is 
l:J 
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but casually mentioned and that there js absolutely no 
evidence showing the details of the mortgage, and espe-
cially, the present am'Ount due under it. Such a casual 
matter cannot be made an issue on appeal. 
"In a suit to quiet tit_le as against a lien of a 
judgment, plaintiffs claim of homestead will not 
be passed on where the pleadings and findings 
are silent on the subj·ect of a homestead and it 
app~ears only incidentally that there was a hom·e-
stead elaim in the former action in which judg-
ment was recovered.'' 
Hickey vs Algie, California 197, Pacific 359. See also 
K ,ozitzsch vs. M iddlton (Calif.) 165 P2 729 at 736. 
POIN'T 4 
THE ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY APPELL.ANT IN HIS 
P~OINT 2 IS BASED ENTIRELY UPON ~~ MIS-S'TAT'E-
MENT OF FACT. 
Appellant eonsist.ently throughout his brief (Pages 
14-18) makes the statement that Respondent has encum-
bered the property with a mortgage equal to the amount 
of the unpaid purchase price, that is, the sum of $8500.00. 
This is a pure and simpl.e mis-.stat1ement ~of the reoord. 
The R.espondent, Neilson, testified that early in 1946 
he placed a -construction mortgage upon the property 
for $8,000.00 ( Tr. 111). There is absolutely nothing in 
the record to indicate that an encumbrance equal to the 
amount of the unpaid balance under the contract ever 
existed. 
The record because no issue concerning the mortgage 
ever arose In a trial court, is very sketchy concerning 
14 
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the mortgage. The only mention appears in Neilson's 
testi1nony~ sun1n1arized at Page 111 of the transcript. 
The fact is, as _.A .. ppellant 'veil kno,Ys, that the 1nortgage 
has al,vays been and is nO\Y considerably less than the 
amount owed by Eisen. 
Consequently, Appellant's contention that Respon-
dent must conYey subject to an encumbrance and -tha.t 
no cash is involved in this litigation is entirely without 
merit. Eisen is entitled to a warranty deed to the prop-
erty upon payment of the moneys due. Concurrent with 
such payment, unless Neilson chooses to make prior pay-
ment of the mortgage, the mortgage will be paid. Such 
procedure is the usual one in real estate transactions. 
Deed, release of encumbrances, and payment of purchase 
money are all given and received in one transaction. No 
other method is practical as purchase money must usu-
ally be used to pay off encumbrances. 
POINT 5 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS N~OT APPLICABLE T'O 
THE INSTANT FACTUAL SITUATION N'OR CAN THE 
QUESTION BE FIRST RAISED ~ON APPEAL. 
The "\Vriter is somewhat at a loss to determine what 
Appellant claims under the argument advanced under 
his Point 3. However, it seems clear that if he claims the 
shelter ·of Statute of Frauds that his position is not 
sound. 
The contract in issue is wholly executed and com-
pletely performed except for the final paym·ent. Eisen 
is in possession of the property and has been for two 
15 
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years. He has paid $13,500.00 u~on the pur_chase price. 
He admits that he and he alone was the purchaser. 
''I was the only one who bought that home, 
and lwas the only one paid for it.'' (Tr. 140). 
Under thes-e circumstances w·e_ ·can. see no possible 
application of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Statute of Frauds is a p·ersonal defense that 
may· he waived. Consequently, being an affirmative de-
ense, it cannot be first raised on_ appeal. 
"In any event, to permit appellant at this late 
date, 'Yhen the agreement in _question has been 
performed in its entirety by respondent, to rely on 
the defense of the statute of frauds would be 
manifestly unfair to respondent and would allo\v 
the appellant to he enriched unjustly at his ex-
pense. The principle here applicable was aptly 
stated by this -court in the case of Flint v. Gig-
uier-e, 50 Cal. A~pp. 314, 320; 195 P. 85, 88 :' * * * 
in cases like this where one of the parties has per-
formed his obligation, has suffe-red the detrim-ent 
contemplated by the agreement, and the other 
party has fully received the henefi t of the trans-
action. the -chancellor has a large dis-cretion in 
determining whether it would be inequitable to 
allow the party who gains by the contract t:o take 
refuge under the statute of frauds, and, unless it 
can be said that such discretion. has been abuserl, 
an appellate court will not interfere'.'' 
"Appellant likewise urges that the agreen1ent 
is invalid as contravening that section of the 
statute of frauds which deals with contracts not 
to he performed during the lifetime 'Of the pronli-
sor and contract:s to devise or bequeath propert~r. 
Civ. Code, ser. 1624, Suhd. 6. J-Ier contention in 
16 
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this regard eYidently is predicated upon certain 
testin1ony indicating that appellant had agreed 
to n1ake a \Yill in respondent's favor and that 
respondent had agreed tu 8ee that appellant re-
ceived a decent burial. Hovvever, these asserted 
provisions are not 1nentioned in the pleadings or 
the findings and matters with reference thereto 
are therefore outside the issues in the case, par-
ticularly as appellant does not ~omplain of the 
action of the trial court in omitting to make a 
finding \Yith respect thereto.'' To bola v. Wholey 
(Calif.) 170 Pacific 2d, P. 956. 
The substance of this rule is recognized by this 
court in Chief Consolidated Mining C·ompany vs. Indus-
trial C·oJnmission, 78 Utah 447, 4 Pacific 2d, 1083 and in 
:ve Jon-es Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 Pacific 2d, 210. 
SUMMARY 
Under our Points 1, 3 and 3 we have cited some of 
the num·erous authorities supporting ~ur contention that 
none of the matters argued by Appellant in his brief can 
be relied upon for the first time on appeal. The trial 
court, sitting in equity, had before it the entire picture 
of the development of this controversy. The issues were 
eliminated and joined at the pre-trial. As the record 
indicates these issues were narrovved dovvn to two prin-
cipal questions: 
(1) Under what agreement was the house bought 
and sold~ 
(2) Did the contract entitle Eisen to a briek gar-
age~ 
17 
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Both these issues were decided -contrary to Appel-
lant's contentions but upon clear and convincing proof. 
Eisen's contention that it was the August agreement 
clearly could not prevail as Neilson had never accepted 
the proposal. Likewise Eisen's claim for damages re-
garding the garage had no merit and his testimony in 
that regard was not worthy of ·belief. He had accepted 
and entered into the possession of the house five months 
after a frame garage was built. In January, after being 
in possession over a month, he paid to Neilson, under 
the exact requirement of .the D·ecember agreement, the 
sum of $6,500.00. Under this set of facts we submit the 
trial court -could not have reached any other conclusion. 
It is also interesting to note that in even the preliin-
inary negotiations that Appellant was represented con-
tinually by counsel who actually drew the documents 
forming the basis of this lawsuit. Respondent was not 
so· represented. 
As we have indicated, the trial court was sitting in 
equity. Having once invoked the equitable powers of 
the ~court the ~parties could not now complain had the 
court granted relief of a nature neither party had asked 
for or anticipated. This however, did not occur. The 
trial court, except ~as to a.mownt, grrarnted the exact relief 
prayed for by Appellant. 
In the prayer of the answer of defendant below, he 
asked the -court to order Neilson ''to deliver to defend-
ant Isadore Eisen a warranty deed of said premises upon 
the defendant Isadore Eisen paying to plaintiff the RUlll 
18 
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of $6107.92. ~' ( Tr. 16). The judgn1ent of the c.ourt was 
exartly as .... t\..ppellant prayed PXePpt as to a1nount. Neil-
son "·as ordered to deliver a 'Ynrranty <leerl to Ei~Pn 
upon rereiYing the full pureha~e prieP. 
Ho'Y then can Appellant be heard to claim, upon 
appeal, that other and different relief should have been 
grantd J? He has abandoned his rlain1 regarding amount 
and no"\v eon1plains that the trial court comn1i tted error 
by doing the exact thing Appellant sought. As the 
authorities indicate, an Appellate Court will turn a rleaf 
ear to such an inconsistent position. 
\"\;"'" e respectively urge the Court that Appellants 
present ·position is untimely, inconsistent, and wholly un-
tenable upon appeal. 
And we further submit that even ha.Cl Appellant 
given the trial court an opportunity to consider his 
present contentions that they are without merit and 
'vould not have changed the result. Eisen was and is in 
possession of the property and in such cas·e does not need 
a deed to protect him from a fraud. Consequently, a 
tender of deed is not a condition precedent to this action. 
Nor is such a tender· necessary when the purchaser indi-
. cates the futility of the gesture as in this case. The 
authorities recognize the futility of tendering a deed to 
a p·erson who says ''I "\vill not pay. I did not enter into 
the contract you claim under." 
As we have indicated, Appellants claim that the 
1nortgage is equal in amount to thP sum rlue under the 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contract is not correct. Consequently, his position that 
"vendors had only one duty to perform and that was 
t.o deliver a de,ed subject to the mortgage" ( App. Brief, 
P. 18) is not sound. Eisen·· owes several thousand dollars 
over and above the mortgage. His contention that he 
may have to pay the judgment and the mortgage debt 
(App. Brief, P. 18) is not well taken. R·espondent, of 
course, reeognizes that upon payment of the judgment 
that he must convey free and clear of the mortgage. But 
the two acts must of necessity he concurrent events: 
Neilson must use the purchase money to pay the mort-
gage. Glassmam vs. Conaot'Yb, 27 Utah 463, 76 P. 343, cited 
by App~ellant is clearly distinguishable. In the Glassman 
case the very issue was whether the purchase price in-
cluded the assumption of the mortgage or only part of 
it. No such question is involved here. 
We respectfully submit that the trial eourt reached 
a just result, committed no error and that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respeetfully submitted 
CALLISTER, CALLISTER & LEWIS 
Attorneys for Resp1ovndent 
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